The logic of actual obligation
O. Introduction
In this paper we develop a system of deontic logic (LAO, the"; logic of actual obligation) with a.rathep limited scope: we are, only interested in obligations as far as they: are; relevant for deciding: what: actions-actually ought to be done in a particular situation, given some normative system, N. In fact we are interested how actual obligations are derived from the prima facie ones implied by N. Hence statements expressing that certain states of affairs are obligatory, such as the speed-limit ought to be 140 in stead of 100", fall out of the scope. (Roughly speaking LAO is what Castaneda calls a logic of "ought-to-do". (cf. [C] ).) Since in LAO actions can be obligatory while assertions cannot, actions and assertions have to be strictly separated in the language of LAO. On this point we follow [M] .
In [E] Job van Eck analyzes the relation between actual-and prima facie obligations in terms of tense. We don't agree with the details of his analysis, but we do believe that the role of time is important in deontic logic in general and in obtaining actual obligations from prima facie ones in particular. In section 1 we give a sketch of van Eck's system of temporally relative deontic logic (QDTL), to get some idea of the role of time in deontic logic. In section 2 QDTL is criticized, especially the fact that obligations are interpreted in terms of perfect alternatives.
In LAO we start with prima facie duties which follow from some normative system N. (A typical example of such an N is a predominant system of morality in some society, which e.g. gives rise to the prima facie obligations not to lie, not to steal, etc.) In general it is possible to have conflicting prima facie obligations and LAO is intended to tell what actually ought to be done in such situations. The output is intended to be directive, i.e. action guiding. Hence we don't consider statements like if it is raining then you ought to have brought your umbrella with you, since such statements cannot give direction to (future) action. (In contrast   1 The logic of actual obligation 2 with It it is likely that it is going to rain, then you ought not to forget your umbrella".) It is important to note that we are not interested,-[n. the question which action is the best in a particular situation buttonly tithe question' which action is obligated. (These questions may be equivalent for utilitarianists, but in general they are not.) Another point is that it doesn't make much sense to apply LAO in a context where the normative system N does not allow obligations to be overruled by stronger ones, i.e. where the notions of actual-and prima facie obligation coincide.
After giving a semantics and an axiomatization of LAO in section 3, we finish by showing in section 4 that the well-known paradoxes of deontic.iogic do not arise in LAO.
In [E] a system; of temporally relative deontic logic-@I L. is, developed which is claimed not: to -have the -deficiencies of traditional deontic systems. ..tn ,particular, temporal relativization makes it possible to represent the difference between' having a-'duty_at time t to do some action at t and having a duty at t to do some action at t'>t -(Van Eck considers this to be the difference between an actual-and a prima facie duty). Further: the turning into an unconditional one can be adequately represented.
Prima facie and actual obligation.
Suppose John promised Suzy (p) to have a cup of coffee with her (q).
Consider
(1) John ought to have a cup of coffee with Suzy.
Traditionally-(1)-is formalized as Qq= and interpreted by vif-Oq : for all w>v w*-q, where w>v means that w .is, a deontically perfect alternative of v.
.
In [E] it is argued that since the truthvalue of (=1) is dependent on the moment of time to which the "ought" =pertains,: (1) cannot be interpreted, in terms of deontically perfect worlds simpliciter. In QDTL (1) is formalized as Otgt+7, where t is the moment of time just after John's promise and t+7 is the time of the date. Otgt+7 means: in all courses of the world which are as good as possible from t on qt+7 (q holds at t+7).
.,__ .
In [E] (1) is seen as an elliptic sentence bearing a tacit 'ceteris paribus' proviso meaning: provided that between t and t+7 no stronger obligations conflicting with (1)"or situations whichr6nder°the realization of q impossible arise. Such duties Which leave room for otWrthings. not being equal are called ''prima facie duties''. If at t+7 the conditions of the 'ceteris paribus' proviso are still met, then Oigt+7 is considered to be an actual duty.
Further the prima facie obligation tO qt+7 is said to imply the actual dutyOtptgt+7, not to snake= q impossible e.g. by killing Suzy or himself. Hence the system Traditionally statement "other things were not equal" is not a sufficient justification for not doing q at t+7.
If at t+2 Suzy dies without John being involved in the matter, then John is not to be blamed for not to obligation since ,worldcourse that were perfect from te,onwards.;have.. become inaccesible°aat., t-a by an, accident"
If at t+1 a stronger obligations arises .such that fulfilling ,s makes q impossible,, then he is also blamed for not doing q -,,since the best world seen from t+1 . is different from In QDTL (2) is formalized as -,qt+70rrt+io, meaning: in all worldcourses that are possible .from t' onwards and are as;perfect as-possiblef --qt+7 is,, the case in them -rt+1o is the case. The use in [E] of the terms "prima facie and actual obligation" is not exactly in accordance with the` use of these terms in `traditional' normative theory. The duties called "actual" in [E] are in this paper referred to by "acute prima facie duties" and we shall call actually obligatory only what actually ought to be done in a particular situation:
E.O. one has a prima facie duty not to He but in a situation where telling the truth has unacceptable consequences it is possible -to have an acute prima facie duty to tell the truth but an actual obligationto lie.
Actions and assertions.
Otgt+7 is said to imply OtOtgt+7, not to make q impossible. But John cannot always be held responsible for q becoming 'impossible-.`iqt+7'does imply that John has a prima facie obligation not to do anything that makes q''impossible (or-even improbable), but such an obligation cannot be expressed in a straightforward way in the language of [E] .,-this problem can 'be resolved if one uses a language where actions and assertions are separated: We'wilI develop such as language, more or less along the lines of [M] , in section 3
Further, if at t+8 -qt+7 is the case, then °t+8 t+7 is-derivable in'QDTL.
However,-®toti, with t>t' is said not to express a real obligation: "At t Ot. is already a part of all possible further courses of the world and a fortiori of all best possible further courses". ( [E],p.73) The same reasoning=wouldshow-that if at t 0t. with t'>t It necessary, then O0t, holds. Although this possibility is not mentioned by van Eck, he would probably not consider this O. to express a real obligation either, since he seems to hold that everything which is obligatorybyvirtue of its necessity does not count as a real (directive) -obligation. We prefer to call obligatory only that which is really obligatory. This means that we cannot interpret obligations-in terms of perfect alternatives, but we do not considef-this to be a great loss:
2.3 (Nearly-)perfect alternatives.
The interpretation of Oqt+7 in terms of best possible future world courses makes sense only if there is some independent way of determining these best possible future world courses.
Suppose va-Oq. It seems that in [E] the only criterion for being. a best possible world, course, for y. j$ that q is. realized somewhere in the course after v.
We see not on what other, grounds, the following world courses are not, considered to be best possible world courses for v:
(i) (ii) knows that) she doesn't mind.
Suzy dies between t and t+7, John not being involved.
At t+S Suzy and John meet by some coincidence, have dinner together and decide that there is, no need for fulfilling qt y., since they would have seen each other only recently aa!, t+7, At t+6 John decides to go shopping and buy Suzy a diamond ring. This makes it impossible for him to meet Suzy before t+9, but (he We have seen that, for all-,,perfect alternatives w of v:
makes all what is, necessary obligatory (and all what is impossible forbidden). On the other hand, "vii--Oq 4 for all perfect ,alternatives., w of v: wt-q" is,. likely, to be valid only if Oq expresses an actual duty. Given -the fact that it is almost always possible todo something supererogatory, like in (iii), an actual. obligation will, usually have the following form: "One. ought to do the prima facie obligated a or some-b which is at, least as good as a". In section 3 we sketch an alternative approach to deontic logic' which enables us to represent, this relation between actual and prima facie obligations.
3. An alternative approach: the Logic of Actual Obligation (LAO)
In this section we first describe a semantics for actions in which the rise of actual obligations =out of prima facie ones is represented and which is intended. to be adequate forVLAO. After obtaining some elementary results concerning this semantics, we propose an axiomatization of LAO. u,v,w,... denote possible worlds. These possible3 worlds are assumed' to be partially ordered by <, which we assume to be transitive, irreflexive and tree-like. v<w means that w is a possible future world seen from v`.`(We assume < to be serial, i.e. Vv3w v<w). a,b,c,... denote actions:
v<aw :a v<w and in the course from v to w action a is done.
v<,aw v<w and in the coursethrough v and w action a Js not done.
V<,aw :
v<w and in the course-from -vV'to w * action '-,a is done, which imple's that' it will= not be possible to do} a? in all coursIes of the world which go through=v and w. .3w>av. Remark on the actions /a and -1a , The action /a (a-complement) is, purely negative characterized doing /a means just abstaining from. ,doing;; a, .i.e. not doing a For doing -,a..,(not-a) it is not sufficient to abstain from a. In addition it is necessaryto. make it irfiposs.ible that a will ever be done. Thus -a is a positive action In the sense defined above, while in general /a is not.
Remark on the action aft: As the first of the above mentioned examples ,of some properties shows,, we assume that the action a&b, if possible at all, contains the actions a and b intact. E.g. if a is "painting the table blue" and b is "painting the table yellow", then it is not possible to do a and b simultaneously, hence a&b=Q. (Thus aft is not e.g. "painting the table green".) Or if a is "John marries Suzy" and bis "John marries Anna", then aft is not empty only in a society where polygamy is allowed.
We can generalize + and & as follows:
If A is a set of actions, then &A is the action which consists of doing all aEA and +A is the action which consist of doing at least one aEA.
(If A is empty, then and A . if A={a}, then A= +A _=a. If A_{a,b}, then &A-=a&b and +A=a+b.) & and + are interdefinable by means of /: &A=/(+A°), where A°:={/a i aEA}. +!A denotes the action which consist of doing exactly one action, aEA (a-Ob is 1{a,b}).'&, + and !will not occur in our formal language, but'will`be used in 'informal arguments 8 We assume that for every world v there exists a partial pre-ordering k, on the set of actions°which° has to satisfy some obvious properties such as and b5,c = a-< c.
a_<vc and bL c : (Subscripts in expressions like a=)Vb and a<,b will be omitted when no confusion a< ,b
The logic of actual obligation is likely to arise.)
The intended' meaning of "action b is at least as--.good, as ordering <_ depends on the normative considered (e.g it is that :in general drinking coffee with not deontically better than drinking coffee,-with Anna(b) but that, due to a promise, O(a) and (therefore) a>b), but we do not assume s to be completely: N,,-.;(In: our typical case of N being a predominant system of morality in some society, the precise ordering of actions in a particular situation is in not determined by N.)
Syntax of -LAO.
We use ao, a1, a2,... for elementary a b,c,.. as-variables. (and meta-variables) and as constant names for actions. Two special constant4 names are U and 0.
Assertions and (compound) actions -are.forh ed as follows:
Actions (A -elementary actions E Act -U and OE Act.
-if a,b E Act, then -,a, the negated action ("not-,a), a, the complementary action (a-complement"), ab, the sequential composition ("ab" or "a followed, byb'!),_ a&b, the joint or simultaneous action ("a and V), a+b, the alternative composition or-choice :action (°'a or b")_ E Act. -if q(a), E ass -(where a E--Act), then 4(A) .n Va$(a) and -3-a0(a)-.yE-'Qss.
Let us list the intended` meanings of some of these assertions: PO : $ has been the case somewhere`in->the.past," P10: 0 was the case in the possible world immediate before this one f- [a]$ : if a will be done, then $ will be the case (In LAO tense operators make it possible: to the, temporal aspects ofdeontic reasoning, whereas in QDTL temporal parameters are used.) The interpretation of non-elementary actions is determined by:. <a =(<aU«a.`U.<a<)°,-where ,u<a.<bw iff 3v: u<av n V<bW, u«a.W iff -=3v:,u<W n w<aV, u.«aw is defined similarly and (<a)c is the,complement,of
The truth value of a proposition of the form O(ff), denoting the prima facie duty to do a, is determined by the valuation of the propositional atoms together with the interpretation of the elementary actions and the set N. This set ,N-, consists-of-1. formulas which express the relevant prima facie obigations -implied, by some system N of norms. We make two assumptions on this system N -we assume that it follows from the system 'N that one cannot be obligated. to do something impossible. (This is implemented by the condition vt--,_ o,D(a) in the forcing clause for vi-O(g).) -we assume that if one has a prima facie duty to do a, then one has a-prima facie duty not to do anything which makes a impossible. Hence we assume that the following is forced: O Prop. 7 (Commutativity) i=a+b = b+a l=a&b=b&a
3.5 Actual and strong obligation.
14 O'(a) does not imply that one is actually obligated to do a (notation: O*(a)), since there may e.g. be stronger duties conflicting with a. More=genbrally one is not to" be blamed in case O'(a) and a is not done, if one does some b Which is at least as good as a. (Remember that the ordering. <--depends on the valuation of formulas of the form O(a), hence if b>_a, then the effect of =a -being-obligatory is already taken into account.)
i,=-(ab)c=a(bc) .
->
Hence if one has the acute obligation to do a, then one has the actual obligation to do a or some b which is at least 'as good as a` On the other hand, itseems that an actual obligation a can only be derived from soma ` The "following proposition shows that actual obligations are `also acute ones:
Proof: Assume vFO*(a).
If a is an acute obligation, then it is actually obligated to do a or some b which is at least as good as a: From Prop. 13 it only follows that the joint of aafinite number of actual ,obligations is again acute obligation and hencenotempty (by lemma 1) But alto the. joint of the possible infinite set of all actual obligated actions is not empty, since it is not only an acute obligation, but even an actual one: (One has the strong obligation to do a if one ;has the actual obligation to do -a and if doing a implies doing every other actual obligation.)
,f. Ps(a) :e -,Os(/a).
(a is strongly permitted if it is not strongly obligatory not to do An axiomatization of LAO is obtained by adding the following. ,axioms and rules to those of propositional logic:
-the formulas mentioned in the propositions 1-10 (or some more economical equivalent set of, formulas).
-formulas expressing the required properties, of ,,:5 (viz. (:51)-(<_7)) and introducing the abbreviations mentioned in section 3.3. Thanks to the rather limited scope of LAO and the 'strict separation of actions from assertions the well-known paradoxes of deontic logic arise in LAO. Further the logic of actual obligation gives more"insight into the normative point of view which lies behind a normative assertion . than the perfect --alternatives approach does.
41 The Ross-paradox.
Traditionally, the following principle is considered to be valid:.
But this leads to.parado)ical -results.-such as '!the` Good Samaritan paradox'' which will be treated below and the Ross paradox":your=Oughtto'postthe letter" implies "you ought to post the, letter or:bu-rn, it".. =The latter :sentence is intuitivelyù nderstood as implying that both mailing the letter and burning it are-°permitted. But it is of course absurd to infer the' permission to burn a letter from an obligation to post it.
A possible answer,, to -the,Ross paradox is;`°t=hat the problem is of a pragmatic nature: one usually doesn't assert a disjunction if one is able to assert one of its disjuncts. The logical connective,Ivim does, not cor-respand-exactly with "or" in ordinary language. However, this is not the whole story.-We believe that there is a sense of "ought" for which the inference from "a-ought to be done" to "a or b ought to be done" is not only pragmatically,, but eve-n.semanticafy invalid: in some situations you ought to do a" means you are doing your duty iff you do a". The notion of strong sense o-,V"oug,ht'".
In LAO we have a:)a+b, theaction=equivalent-of' o =+ ovyr, and although in general the implication aDc -+ (O(a) -+ O(c)) is not valid, it..cannot-be excluded that for some systems N it is. We certainly have the validity of O'(a) --O'(a+b). However we don't have Os(a) -, Os(a+b), unless a=a+b, i.e. bra. It is easy to check that if a+b is strongly obligated, for some hon-ehrnpty:a and b, then-.bothaa, and b are strongly permitted. Fence the Ross-paradox cannot be the notion of strong obligation. 
The Chisholm-pa rac1o
In [Ch] Chisholm formulated in essence the following paradox: Consider 1 a o.ught,,to. be done 2 _if .a is done, than b ought to be done 3. if -,a is done, then -,b ought to be done 4: -,a is, done:,:.
5. -,bought to be done Intuitively the set consisting of the sentences 1.-4. is both consistent and non-redundant, i:.e. no sentence among f.-4=is-derivable from the other. three. Further, P. and 4. intuitively.-imply 5. However, all known formalizations. in monadic deontic logic,., of t-4. render a set-of sentences which.-is either inconsistent or redundant; (cf. ,[A]) and; those in dyadic logic do not allow the inference to 5.
By taking the role of time into consideration, van Eck is able to overcome these difficulties in [E] . He arrives at something like :.the ,followings formalization {Otat+7,at+7Otbt+17,,at+7Ot,bt+17,-aat+7}. However, we don't consider his solution entirely satisfactory. ,E.g. in QDTL it is not excluded, for a to be obligatory at some time when a is already impossible: suppose doing ct+1 implies the impossibility of doing at+7, then after doing-ct,+fi'`we. still have 0t+2 t+7, but also and hence Ot+2-'at+T since in QDTL to implies Oto. Notice that we-have, assumed that -b or--,b ought to be done a f t e r doing a or tea.
some versions of the Chisholm-paradox to imply that b (mob) ought to be done beforea -a). We Aside ;from the Ross-paradox, the principle (O) seems to have another paradoxical result:
Let Suzy be the unique girl which will be killed by John and supp'osefthat-John ought to marry Suzy (e.g. because he has impregnated -her). Then "John ought to be going to kill a girl", since
(1) "John marries the girl he will kill" (a) implies "John will kill a girl" (b) and (2) John ought to marry the girl he will kill (viz. =Suzy.
It is generally assumed that,' even without rejecting {O);;`scope distinctions avoid the,, paradox.
(2)-marrying ='rs in the scope of the -"ought' blot 'killing hot.-Cf. [C] .)
In (11 is not =valid: we do not have a:-3b. Hence this paradox does not-seem much of a-problem.::. However, {F) Jan es -Forrester, formulates the°taliowing version of the Good Samaritan paradox, which is not as easily dismantled:
Suppose that itis settled that Hence John,ought,,to murder, Suzy .implies that he ought to murder Suzy.
In [LB2] Barry Loewer and Marvin Belzer accept that John ought to murder Suzy gently. Their solution of the paradox= consists in making a virtue out of necessity (i.e.` everything is =settled= is-,obligatory) "thereby making the obligation to murder Suzy a vacuous one -Since .trey are themselves got satisfied with this, they define a deontic operator O+(in their notation: O*) such that O+p., holds whenever Op holds and p isnot, settled. Then but not" O+c. We agree that :being-necessary-.-does being= obligatory; but -""on 'the other hand being .necessary does not imply being not=obligatory either. At first. sight. the aboveof the G®od-`Samaritan-paradox also seems to. arise in since now-we do have dec. However;' as it stands, e " inought-to-be form; 3}:does--not fall in the scope -oi LAO, nor does any reasonable approximation in ought-to-do form, such as [c]O* (D(d) ). In our opinion this`is= not due to a weakness of LAO since we do not believe that (3) can be used to infer John that John has any kind of obligation to murder Suzy gently, even in case it, is settled that he will murder her. Aside from the prima facie duty not to murder Suzy, John is also prima facie obligated not to cause unnecessary suffering.
Hence a cruel murder is worse than agent e_one, but,it :remains wrong to: murder Suzy gently.
Normative point of view.
In the logic of actual obligation the different areas which together decide which action actually ought to be done are clearly separated:
(1) the general statements expressing prima facie obligations, such as you ought not to lie". (N) (2) the question whether one of those general statements is applicable on some particular action =(AO. ,.,,;, (3). the question which act ors"-re..possi.ble in a: particular situation and which worlds are the possible outcomes of those actions. Since, normative arguments can,.,arise out. of disagreement in any one of the areas (1) -(4), it is useful to keep them separated.
We believe that a person's normative point of view is better learnt by letting him .specify ahis: decisions in all. these areas (e g. by Jetting.him specify a LAO-model) than by asking him which possible future courses,-ot-the, world he considers to be as perfect as possible (cf. [E] ) or how he ranks the possible
courses.(cf. [LB1])
,
